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COVID-19 and the Law: Elections 
 
Richard Briffault, Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School 
 
I. Introduction 
With one Supreme Court decision, lower federal and state court decisions, pending 
litigation, and proposals around the country for major changes in how elections are conducted, 
COVID-19 has already had and likely will continue to have a significant impact on election law.  
The discussion that follows proceeds in two parts. The first addresses the initial 
consequences of COVID-19 as an electoral emergency. Voters were due to go to the polls in states 
around the country just as the pandemic was gathering force and governors and mayors were 
calling on people to stay at home and avoid large gatherings – which, of course, often occur at 
crowded polling places during contested elections. Although many states managed to move their 
late March and April elections to May, June, or later without incident, heated political and legal 
battles broke out in Ohio and Wisconsin over changing election dates and formats, with the 
Wisconsin dispute winding up in both the state and United States Supreme Courts the day before 
the election, and Wisconsin conducting an in-person election in the middle of a pandemic. 
The second part looks beyond the immediate effects of COVID-19 to the middle term, that 
is, to the host of changes to election laws that will be needed for the November 2020 election if, 
due to the pandemic, large gatherings remain a public health threat. Some form of primarily vote-
by-mail system will be needed, but such a system is currently in place only in five states, and 
those states took several election cycles to make the transition from traditional polling-place 
voting. Indeed, right now, one-third of the states permit only voters with one of a limited number 
of excuses specified in the states’ statutes to obtain a mail-in ballot. Widespread changes in 
voting laws will be necessary if the November elections are to be safe, fair, and secure. Yet, 
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partisan opposition encouraged by President Trump’s error-filled misstatements about voting-
by-mail1 makes it unclear whether these changes will be made.   
 
II. COVID-19 as Election Emergency 
COVID-19 first became a factor in the 2020 elections on March 17, when four major states – 
Arizona, Florida, Illinois, and Ohio – were set to hold their presidential primaries and other 
elections.  Voting went ahead in the first three states, although the process was troubled in many 
places by the failure of poll workers – many of whom are over sixty – to report for duty, the 
resulting last-minute closure of some polling places, and the shortage of hand sanitizer and wipes 
for the voting machines.2 In Arizona and Florida – states with previously high levels of voting by 
mail and early in-person voting – overall turnout was strong even though there were fewer in-
person voters than in the 2016 primaries. Turnout was considerably lower in Illinois, where most 
voters vote in person on election day and, due to COVID-19 anxieties, many were unable or 
unwilling to do so. 
The situation in Ohio was more complicated. On March 16, Governor DeWine announced at 
a press conference that it was unsafe to hold the election scheduled for the following day. 
Although he said he lacked the authority to reschedule the election, he anticipated (and would 
not contest) a private lawsuit claiming that requiring voters at risk of coronavirus to come to the 
polls is unconstitutional and seeking a postponement of the election. However, later that day, 
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas rejected the suit, finding that it would set a “terrible 
precedent” to postpone an election 12 hours before polling places were scheduled to open.3 
Then, just when it looked like the election would be held as scheduled, the Director of the Ohio 
Department of Health, presumably acting at the behest of the governor, issued an order closing 









all polling places on health grounds. The Secretary of State – the state’s chief elections officer – 
followed up with another order rescheduling in-person voting for the 2020 primaries for June 2, 
2020; allowing absentee balloting to continue until then; and extending the deadlines for 
requesting absentee ballots, counting them, canvassing them, and certifying election results.  
The secretary most likely lacked the statutory authority to do any of this, and suits were filed 
challenging his action. On March 21, he sent a letter to the legislature requesting that it set a 
June 2 primary, allow in-person voting on that day, but also facilitate vote-by-mail by providing 
that every registered voter be mailed a postage-paid absentee ballot application. He explained 
that under current public health conditions it would be logistically impossible for election officials 
to handle the anticipated surge in requests for mail-in ballots any earlier. The Ohio legislature, 
however, ignored the Secretary’s request – which had been supported by Ohio’s local election 
officials -- and on March 25 voted to re-set the primary as a nearly all vote-by-mail election for 
April 28. The governor signed the new law into effect on March 27, but a collection of civil and 
voting rights groups immediately brought suit challenging the new law. The plaintiffs contended 
that the law’s “cumbersome, multi-step process for voting by mail” – which requires millions of 
voters to obtain an absentee ballot application, and then complete and submit it; election 
officials to review and approve the application, and mail the ballot to the voter; and have the 
voter receive, complete and return the ballot within a month – would inevitably result in many 
voters being denied the ability to participate in the election.  
On April 3, the federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio rejected the suit. Judge 
Watson acknowledged that “the compressed timeframe for the completion of absentee voting 
does pose a burden on voters,” but concluded that the state’s interest in making sure the voting 
process was resolved in time to have delegates selected for the national party conventions 
justified the earlier deadline. Nor did the state have to simplify the vote-by-mail process to make 
it easier for voters to use. “Given the upheaval that the change to the voting process has already 
created, the Court agrees that the State has a strong interest in minimizing disorder and easing 
the burdens on county boards of elections. By permitting the boards of elections to continue to 
use the absentee-balloting system already in place and changing only the deadline for accepting 
those ballots, H.B. 197 furthers that interest..” In short, Judge Watson concluded “the 
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Constitution does not require the best plan, just a lawful one,” and the legislature’s plan crossed 
that low bar.4 
If Ohio’s response to COVID-19 was messy, Wisconsin’s was a train-wreck. On April 7, 
Wisconsin was scheduled to hold its spring election, which included a presidential primary, a 
hotly-contested partisan race for the state supreme court, elections for three seats on the state 
court of appeals, one statewide and more than one hundred local referenda, and close to three 
thousand elections for lower court, county, town, village, and school district board positions. On 
March 12, Governor Evers declared a public health emergency in the state; on March 25 he issued 
a stay-at-home order, and on April 4, FEMA issued a major disaster declaration for the entire 
State of Wisconsin as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The governor, however, initially 
declined to postpone the election, explaining that he lacked the authority to do so, and called on 
the legislature to adopt universal vote-by-mail. At that point, there had already been an 
unprecedented level of requests for mail-in ballots – nearly five times the level in 2016, and state 
election officials were having difficulty coping with the demand.  
On April 2, a federal judge in the Western District of Wisconsin responded to suits brought by 
the national and state Democratic parties, voting rights groups, and individual voters by issuing 
an order modifying Wisconsin’s election law to deal with the surge in demand for mail-in ballots. 
Specifically, Judge Conley found that due to the backlog in processing ballot requests, it was likely 
that thousands of voters would not get their ballots in time to have them returned to election 
offices by 8 pm on Election Day, and so he ordered that ballots be accepted if received up to six 
days later. In addition, he declined to add a requirement that the ballots be postmarked on 
Election Day; a ballot would be counted if received by the new deadline, April 13, even if mailed 
after Election Day. He also extended by one day the deadline for the receipt of absentee ballot 
applications, and eased the requirement that the ballot be witnessed. The court, however, 
                                                             




declined to postpone the election, or to modify the state’s photo ID requirement.5 The national 
and state Republican parties immediately moved to block the court’s order. 
On Friday, April 3, the governor called the legislature into special session to adopt universal 
vote-by-mail for the election. The legislature met on Saturday, April 4, and without debate or 
discussion immediately adjourned.6 On Monday, April 6, with conditions in Wisconsin worsening 
– due to a lack of poll workers, Milwaukee had reduced the number of polling places from 181 to 
5, and Green Bay had consolidated its polling places from 31 to 2 – the governor, relying on his 
constitutional authority as chief executive and a statute authorizing him to take such action in an 
emergency as "he or she deems necessary for the security of persons and property,” issued an 
executive order suspending the April 7 election until June 9, authorizing voters to continue to 
apply for and return absentee ballots until the election, and calling the legislature back into 
session.7 The Republican-led state legislature promptly sued in the state supreme court to block 
the governor’s action. 
On April 6, the two Supreme Courts – Wisconsin and United States – dividing on party lines8 
blocked the key emergency actions of, respectively, the governor and the federal district court. 
The state supreme court, by a 4-2 vote, held that none of the state constitutional provisions the 
governor invoked gave him the power to suspend or rewrite the state’s election laws. As for his 
statutory claim, the majority determined that the broad grant in the quoted provision was limited 
by another subsection of the same law which specifically authorized the governor to “suspend 
the provisions of any administrative rule” in emergencies. If the broad power to act in an 
emergency that the governor claimed included the power to suspend statutes, the specific grant 
of power to suspend administrative rules would have been “pure surplusage.” In other words, by 
                                                             





8 Justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are elected. The election is technically nonpartisan, but the candidates 
run as partisans with party support. The four judges in the majority were elected with Republican support; the two 




granting the power to suspend rules the law implicitly denied the power to suspend statutes. The 
dissenters unsuccessfully argued that as a matter of textual interpretation the statutory grant of 
authority to protect the “security of persons” included the power to protect voters from the 
danger of exposure to COVID-19; they also contended that the statutory authority of the state 
health department to “forbid public gatherings” in order to control the spread of communicable 
diseases surely meant that the governor could for the same reason bar public gatherings at 
polling places.9 
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in the aptly named Republican National 
Committee v. Democratic National Committee10 was whether to stay the portion of Judge 
Conley’s order directing Wisconsin election officials to accept absentee ballots through April 13, 
the new deadline for the receipt of such ballots, even if they were mailed or postmarked after 
April 7, the original Wisconsin election day. (The portion of the order directing acceptance of 
ballots arriving after April 7 was not challenged). Like the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the United 
States Supreme Court also divided along partisan lines, with the five-member majority 
determining that the district court’s order violated the so-called Purcell principle – the rule, based 
on the Court’s decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006), “that lower federal courts should 
ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.”  As the per curiam opinion 
explained, the Purcell principle is intended to prevent the “kind of judicially created confusion” 
that can result from election law changes on the eve of an election.11 Without acknowledging 
that the Wisconsin election was probably far more disrupted by the pandemic itself than by the 
district court’s order, the Court emphasized that allowing voters to mail ballots after election day 
“is extraordinary relief and would fundamentally alter the nature of the election.”12 Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the four dissenters, emphasized how the unprecedented surge in absentee 
ballot requests had overwhelmed election administrators, so that tens of thousands of voters 
                                                             
9 Wisconsin Legislature v. Evers, Wisconsin Sup. Ct., No. 2020AP608-OA, April 6, 2020, 
https://www.wicourts.gov/news/docs/2020AP608_2.pdf. 
10 589 U.S. ____ (2020), No. 19A1016, April 6, 2020 (granting stay of district court order granting preliminary 
injunction). 
11 Id. at 2-3. 
12 Id. at 4. 
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were unlikely to receive their ballots in time to return them by the April 7 deadline.13 As a result, 
“they will have to brave the polls, endangering their own and others’ safety. Or they will lose 
their right to vote, through no fault of their own.”14 
The Ohio and Wisconsin experiences with their COVID-19-impacted elections were, 
fortunately, atypical. At least nineteen states managed to reschedule their primaries or other 
elections to later dates or to shift from in-person to all-mail elections without the Sturm und 
Drang that marked these two Midwestern states.15 Nonetheless, the Ohio and Wisconsin cases 
do provide some important lessons. First, in our federal system it is the states that write the 
election laws. State election laws also govern elections to federal offices, unless changed by 
Congress. Many states lack clear rules for delaying or rescheduling an election in the event an 
emergency makes holding the election as originally scheduled dangerous or impossible.16 There 
are certainly reasons to be extremely cautious about enabling a partisan official to postpone an 
election or rewrite the election laws at the last minute on his or her own. And as the Purcell 
principle confirms, those concerns are not limited to actions by officials elected on partisan lines. 
Last-minute changes are disruptive and may be seen as having partisan consequences whatever 
the intention. All states should have rules in place to deal with emergencies, but as the Ohio and 
Wisconsin experiences indicate, many states do not.  
Second, in the absence of clear rules, decisions dealing with an electoral emergency as it 
unfolds can take on a partisan cast. That was less true in Ohio, where all the major actors – the 
governor who postponed the election and the secretary of state who sought a long delay, and 
the legislature which moved up the date for the new election – were Republican, but the partisan 
divide was evident in Wisconsin between the Democratic governor and the Republican legislature 
and Republican-dominated state supreme court. Surely the legislature resisted and the state and 
national Republican parties sued to block the election delay and the liberalization of the rules 
                                                             
13 According to one press account published shortly after the election, at least 9,000 ballots were never mailed to 
voters, and thousands more not returned or nullified because returned too late to count. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/us/politics/wisconsin-election-absentee-coronavirus.html. 





governing voting-by-mail ballots at least in part because they assumed they would benefit 
electorally from the depressed turnout in urban centers like Milwaukee that were particularly 
hard-hit by COVID-19.17 This seems to be a national Republican strategy as well.18  
Finally, as Ohio and Wisconsin illustrate, any shift from a predominantly vote-in-person to a 
predominantly vote-by-mail system will require significant legal and administrative adaptations 
of the processes by which voters obtain and submit – and administrators transmit and review – 
mailed-in ballots. The questions that need to be resolved in order to make vote-by-mail widely 
available this November are the focus of the next section. 
 
III. Moving to Voting-by-Mail  
Traditionally, Americans voted by going to a designated neighborhood polling place on a 
specific date and casting their ballots at that place. Over time, new forms of voting were 
authorized. Absentee voting enables voters who cannot make it to the polls, such as because of 
illness or disability or absence from home, to obtain a ballot and mail it in. Over time, the rules 
governing absentee voting have been liberalized and today twenty-eight states and the District 
of Columbia provide for so-called “no-excuses” absentee voting, in which anyone can request 
that a ballot be mailed to them without having to give a reason. In an additional five states – 
Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah, and Washington – elections are conducted entirely by mail; 
ballots are simply mailed to all registered voters at their home addresses several weeks before 
the election. Seventeen states continue to require the voter to have one of the statutorily 
determined excuses in order to vote absentee.19 Many states have also implemented procedures 
for “early in-person voting” which enables the voter to vote at central locations during a 
designated period before Election Day. Currently, forty-one states and the District of Columbia 
authorize early in-person voting. 
                                                             
17 That strategy appeared to fail in the election for the most important state office on the April 7 ballot, justice on 






In the last three election cycles, approximately one-quarter of all ballots were cast by mail, 
with particularly heavy usage in a handful of western states, including the all-mail voting states.20 
In 2018, another one-fifth of voters voted at early in-person voting sites. That, however, means 
that roughly 55% of voters voted at a polling place on Election Day. In most states that fraction is 
far higher; in 2018, in 31 states fewer than 15% of ballots were cast by mail.21 
If the pandemic persists into the fall, it will be impossible for the November elections to be 
held in a fair and safe manner unless early in-person voting and especially voting-by-mail are 
available to all Americans. Fifty-eight percent of poll workers are 61 or older – 27% are over 70 – 
the group at greatest risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19. And of course millions of 
Americans will reasonably be reluctant to risk their health and that of their families by coming to 
a crowded polling place. Widespread revision of voting laws to facilitate voting-by-mail is 
essential. 
Among the multiple legislative or regulatory changes many states will need to make are: (i) 
making it easier for voters to obtain mail-in ballots; (ii) setting reasonable deadlines for voters to 
request and return ballots; and (iii) adopting procedures for resolving disputes over whether the 
signature on the voter’s application or returned ballot matches the signature on file and for giving 
voters an opportunity to challenge the rejection of ballots on signature mismatch grounds; and 
(iv) modifying burdensome voter ID and witnessing requirements, as well as restrictions on the 
ability of community groups to collect and submit ballots. 
On the first point, in many states, the voter has to take the first step of requesting a mail-in 
ballot. Although in some places this can be done by filing an online application, that option may 
not be available to voters without internet access; other states require that the voter first request 
an application, which must be mailed in. One way to deal with this would be for the state to mail 
a ballot, or at least a ballot application, to all registered voters. The all vote-by-mail States use 
the former process. Election law specialists concerned about the prospect of ballots being sent 
                                                             
20 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Administration and Voting Survey 2018 Comprehensive Report, 





to addresses from which the voters have moved or to voters who have died, so that the ballots 
could be subject to fraudulent misuse, object to such mass mailing of ballots (although there is 
little evidence of fraud in the all-mail states). Mass mailing of applications (ideally with a postage-
paid self-sealing envelope) would still place a burden on the voter to apply, but it would at least 
eliminate one step in the process. Moreover, as long as in-person voting remains an option, it 
has the advantage of avoiding mailing an unnecessary ballot to a voter who intends to vote in 
person. 
As the Wisconsin litigation indicates, the return date for mail-in ballots is a critical question. 
Some states require that the ballot be received by Election Day; others only that it be mailed by 
Election Day, and received within a defined number of days after Election Day. Giving the voter 
more time is surely more consistent with protecting the right to vote, especially given the 
likelihood of delays in postal deliveries of ballots to and returns by voters; it may give election 
administrators more time to handle a flood of mailed-in ballots. And many voters are likely to fix 
on Election Day as the day to vote; others may be hesitating between voting in person or by mail. 
The main downside of the Election Day mailing deadline is that means that the results of some 
elections may not be known until days after Election Day. 
Other new administrative rules or laws are likely to be necessary to standardize the 
procedures by which election officials check signatures on applications or ballot envelopes to see 
if they match those on file, and to give voters the opportunity to challenge rejections. Signature-
match laws that fail to give voters an adequate opportunity to challenge rejections were already 
subject to litigation before COVID-19.22 Similarly, at a time when, due to social distancing 
requirements and the closure of public libraries and similar facilities, it may be difficult for voters 
to obtain the signatures of witnesses or submit copies of their photo IDs as some states require. 
One component of the district court preliminary injunction in the Wisconsin litigation, not at issue 
in the Supreme Court, was the court’s order lifting the witnessing requirement for voters 
attesting that a witness was unavailable. Similarly, restrictions on the ability of community groups 
to collect and submit absentee ballots – justified by an asserted need to prevent fraud – may 




need to be modified because of the burdens on some voters, such as Native Americans who live 
in rural areas without adequate mail service. Rules such as these had been challenged by voting 
rights groups even before COVID-19 became a factor.  
At least as important as legal changes will be the significant costs that will have to be incurred 
in order to switch to a primarily vote-by-mail election. “The equipment that states have to 
conduct in-person elections won’t work for mail-in elections. The scanners many states have to 
count ballots in each polling place can’t handle counting ballots en masse from the whole county 
or state. The kind of scanner that can do that heavy work costs $500,000 to $1 million . . . . Also, 
states can’t just mail out the ballots they already have printed. They have to design ballots that 
can be folded into an envelope. They also need to print instructions for how to fill it out and send 
it back. And they need to design the ballot to work with the Postal Service.”23 As one state 
election official contemplating the switch to vote-by-mail also noted, “part of that calculation is 
figuring out how to pay for postage for those ballots, so no one has to go out and buy stamps.”24 
And, moving rapidly to a primarily vote-by-mail system will require mass retraining of poll 
workers and education of voters. 
All this will cost money. The Brennan Center for Justice estimates that the cost of moving to 
a primarily vote-by-mail election this year will be between $1 billion and $1.4 billion – with most 
of the expenditure going to ballot processing, secure ballot storage, additional staffing, public 
education, and, especially, postage costs.25 The Brennan Center study also emphasizes that an 
estimated $270 million will need to be spent to assure that in-person voting – which will remain 
the preferred form of voting for many Americans – is safe and secure, with the money going to 
make sure polling places comply with public health standards, hire poll workers, and increase 
access to early in-person voting.26  
                                                             
23 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/03/vote-by-mail-difficulties/. 






Responding to COVID-19 will also likely require legal changes and new resources to improve 
voter registration systems. Typically, in the run-up to a presidential election, millions of people 
update their voter registration information or register to vote for the first time. COVID-19 could 
severely disrupt this process, making it difficult for Americans to submit timely registration 
applications or for elections officials to process those applications. The outbreak will certainly 
reduce access to government offices that provide voter registration services. Although thirty-
nine states and the District of Columbia have either fully implemented online voter registration 
or are in the process of doing so, the other eleven states need to do so before the fall. And all 
states with online voter registration systems will need to test and bolster their capacity to ensure 
they can handle the likely surge in usage.  
With the states already incurring significant costs in addressing the health crisis posed by 
COVID-19 while sustaining massive losses in revenues from sales and income taxes due to the 
pandemic’s impact on commerce and employment, some of the funding for addressing COVID-
19’s impact on our electoral system ought to come from the federal government. Senators 
Wyden and Klobuchar have introduced legislation that would require all states to offer voting-
by-mail and early in-person voting if twenty-five percent of the states have declared a state of 
emergency due to COVID-19, and would provide federal funds to cover the cost.27  
In the negotiations over the development of the CARES Act – the $2.1 trillion COVID-19 
response law enacted in late March – the House of Representatives proposed to appropriate $4 
billion for election safety and security measures that would require all states to institute vote-
by-mail, early-in-person voting, and online voter registration. The Senate initially offered only 
$140 million. The final bill provided $400 million but with no requirements for improved access 
to the ballot or voter registration. That was a step in the right direction but likely inadequate to 
the full task of conducting fair and secure elections in the face of a pandemic.  
 The prospects that our election laws will be made COVID-19-ready are uncertain. 
President Trump has slammed mail-in voting, tweeting that it “doesn’t work out well for 






Republicans,”28 and other Republican leaders have followed suit, with House Republican leader 
Kevin McCarthy calling the continued push by Democrats to include more funding for voting-by-
mail in the next COVID-19 relief bill “disgusting.”29 In recent decades, election laws have 
frequently been assessed in partisan terms, and the response to COVID-19 seems to already be 
caught up in the partisan divide. If that remains the case, then COVID-19 may turn out to be an 
even greater disaster for American democracy than it has been for public health. 
 
  
                                                             
28 https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/08/trump-slams-mail-in-voting-says-it-doesnt-work-out-well-for-
republicans.html.  
29 https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/08/trump-slams-mail-in-voting-says-it-doesnt-work-out-well-for-
republicans.html. 
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